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The study of discourse assists scholars in understanding and explaining the ways in 
which words, utterances, and dialogue impact occurrences within international relations. Jürgen 
Habermas’ discourse ethics situates communicative processes within a context of equitable 
discourse that, upon reaching consensus between parties, can arrive at just conclusions. Critics 
believe that power constructs within societies, however, abridge the occurrence of equitable 
communication, representative of minority and marginalized populations. Thus, on a theoretical 
level, this thesis seeks to account for the short-comings of Habermasian discourse ethics by 
placing it into conversation with Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition and Judith Butler’s theory 
of grievable life. This theoretical conglomeration allows for the discourses of minority groups to 
be accounted for within the public sphere of discourse, especially in regard to issues of 
contemporary military engagement and security.      
Technological advancements in warfare have produced weapons that are designed to 
protect soldiers through speed, precision, and the ultimate removal of humans from the 
battlefield. This focus on casualty aversion has redistributed the risk from soldiers to 
noncombatants through impersonal delivery systems like Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), 
prioritizing the lives of soldiers over the lives of noncombatants. Understanding the importance 
of discourse ethics, this dominant discourse of casualty aversion should be placed into deliberate 
conversation with subversive discourses that would allow for the voices of noncombatants who 
have been victimized by drone warfare to be included within the public sphere. Thus, this thesis 
questions the prevalent utilization of precision-based weaponry that fails to recognize the voices 
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In a field outside of a village in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region in northwest Pakistan a 
90 by 60 foot portrait of a small child stares into the sky. Created by a collective of Western and 
Pakistani artists who are interested in “[sharing] the untold stories and images of people in their 
communities,”
1
 the art installation, entitled #NotABugSplat, can be seen by American drones 
conducting surveillance and combat missions.
2
 The artists claim that this picture of a child who 
lost members of her family to a drone strike “target[s] predator drone operators sitting thousands 
of miles away who refer to kills as BugSplats. Now they’ll see a child’s face instead.”
3
 The 
artists behind #NotABugSplat do not intend to stop with one installation, but want “to continue 
to put up more posters of children to instigate further dialogue and awareness.”
4
 Whether or not 
this campaign will influence change in American military practices, this art installation 
articulates a shift in the public drone narrative from wonderment about the precision and 
technological advancement of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to the impact that they have 
upon people. 
Discourse Ethics: Analyzing Discourse 
Dialectic philosophers in the Frankfort School tradition, such as Jürgen Habermas, 
concentrate upon the importance of communication as the foundational, constitutive attribute of 
society. Agents operate in the world through speech acts, which establish meaning not only to 
the words that one speaks, but looks to the intention underpinning the words. As J. L. Austin 
                                               
1 Sophia Sifi, “Not a ‘Bug Splat:’ Artists Give Drone Victims a Face in Pakistan,” CNN.com, 9 April 2014, 
accessed 9 May 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/09/world/asia/pakistan-drones-not-a-bug-splat/.  
2 Zach Schonfeld, “#NotABugSplat, an Art Project Designed to Be Seen by Drones,” Newsweek, 8 April 
2014, accessed  8 April, 2014,  http://www.newsweek.com/notabugsplat-art-project-designed-be-seen-drones-
245191.  
3 #NotABugSplat, “About,” NotABugSplat.com, accessed 17 July 2014, http://notabugsplat.com/about/.  
4 Sifi, “Not a ‘Bug Splat:’ Artists Give Drone Victims a Face in Pakistan.” 
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notes, communication is “to say something is to do something; or in which by saying or in saying 
something we are doing something.”
5
 
Using Aristotelean language, Habermas presents four types of “linguistically mediated 
interaction”
6
 each with its own teleology or purpose-driven-ness.
7
 His concentration on 
teleology, in the tradition of Austin’s speech-act theory, suggests an emphasis on the result or 
goal of the communicative act, rather than mere concentration on the words uttered.
8
 The first 
type of interaction delineated by Habermas is strategic. The goal of strategic interaction is for 
one party to influence the behavior of a second party, precipitating a desired action or outcome.
9
 
Second, Habermas describes a conversational type of communication. The goal of this 
interaction is to convey information from one party to another that describes an event or 
situational environment (i.e. “The dog is outside.”) Third, Habermas outlines dramaturgical 
action, the goal of which is to expressively convey a particular, intentional re-presentation of a 
social narrative to an audience by “purposefully disclosing his subjectivity.”
10
           
Fourth, and most important for this analysis, Habermas presents the process of speech 
action or discourse as communicative action, noting that it is a collaborative endeavor of 
mutuality designed to resolve conflicting viewpoints. In order for discourse to be effective, 
                                               
5 J. L. Austin, How To Do Things With Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 12. Emphasis is in 
the original.   
6 David Ingram, Habermas and the Dialectic of Reason (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 41.  
7 Habermas includes a chart describing his understanding of “Aspects of the Rationality of Action” on page 
334 of The Theory of Communication, Vol. 1.   
8 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communication, Vol. 1, transl. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1984), 85.   
9 For example, Steele uses Habermasian strategic language along with ontological reflexivity to explain a 
perceived shift from “stingy” to “generous” American aid allocation after the 2004 Asian tsunami (Brent Steele, 
“Making Words Matter: The Asian Tsunami, Darfur, and ‘Reflexive Discourse’ in International Politics,” 
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 51, especially 913-918). Habermasian strategic language is also used in: Marc 
Lynch, “Why Engage? China and the Logic of Communicative Engagement,” European Journal of International 
Relations, Vol.8, No.2  (2002): 187-230 and Thomas Risse, “‘Let’s Argue!’: Communicative Action in World 
Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 1 (Winter, 2000): 1-39.    
10 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communication, Vol. 1, 86. 
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participants must presuppose a stance of equity and “universal solidarity with all others.”
11
 Thus, 
through the practice of discourse “actors seek to reach an understanding about the action 
situation and their plans of action in order to coordinate their actions by way of agreement.”
12
  It 
is at the point of agreement that the ethical consensus is achieved.
13
 
While critiques of Habermas’ assumption of discourse as being fundamentally egalitarian 
and democratic will be discussed in the following chapter, it is important to mention Habermas’ 
belief that within the bounds of political liberalism, dominant, institutionalized discourses should 
be questioned. Habermas chides liberal democracies for their dialectic complacency and 
encourages critical political discourse. “Claims to validity involving practical quest ions and 
political decisions were intended to be continually questioned and tested.”
14
 Additionally, the 
dialectic process is central to the “cooperative search for truth.”
15
 Ultimately, the discursive 
telos, central also to political liberalism, is the realization of justice. “Justice,” according to 
Habermas, is “not a particular value but a dimension of validity.”
16
 Thus, dominant political 
discourses that appear to abridge another’s realization of justice should be challenged and 
altered.  
In the Habermasian tradition of critical discourse, this analysis takes into consideration 
attempts in the international public sphere (such as the #NotABugSplat art installation) to 
challenge the dominant military discourse of casualty averse warfare in order to allow for 
renewed examination of the human cost of distance-fought, precision-based warfare.           
                                               
11 James Gordon Finlayson, Habermas: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005), 60. 
12 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communication, Vol. 1, 86.  
13 Ingram, 31.  
14 Jürgen Habermas, Theory and Practice, transl. John Viertel (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), 26. Emphasis 
is in the original. 
15  Torben Hviid Nielsen and Jürgen Habermas, “Jürgen Habermas: Morality, Society and Ethics,” Acta 
Sociologica, Vol. 33, No. 2 (1990), 101. 
16 Ibid., 96.  
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Precision and Casualty Averse Warfare: Establishing the Dominant Discourse 
 
[We must] challenge the status quo as we design a new architecture 
for the defense of America…On land, our heavy forces will be 
lighter, our light forces will be more lethal. All will be easier to 
deploy and to sustain. In the air, we will be able to strike across the 
world with pinpoint accuracy, using both aircraft and unmanned 
systems. On the oceans we will connect information and weapons in 
new ways, maximizing our ability to project power over land. In 
space, we’ll protect our network of satellites essential to the flow of 
our commerce and the defense of our comment interests. 





American military engagement in the Post-Cold War world has taken on a markedly 
different tone. Lacking a monolithic adversary,
18
 American forces have taken on smaller-scale, 
shorter-term missions dominated by the use of strategic air-based strikes.
19
 This transition from 
modern, total warfare (evidenced in World Wars I and II) to a limited-engagement, precision and 
speed-focused model of warfare, has been widely regarded as a Revolution in Military Affairs 
(RMA).
20
 Latham acknowledges that this RMA “has been ‘triggered’ by technological changes” 
and is characterized by “a transformation of most (if not all) dimensions of the mode of 
warfare.”
21
 Prior to 9/11 and the Global War on Terror, Latham sagely suggested that threat had 
been redefined in the Western world. Instead of “the Soviet Other” providing the primary 
security threat, it is now characterized “by a range of actually or potentially hostile Third World 
                                               
17 George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President to the Troops and Personnel,” The White House: President 
George W. Bush, 13 February 2001, accessed 15 July 2013,  http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/20010213-1.html    
18 The Economist comments that “Defense-industry folk sometimes get nostalgic about the cold war…[they 
miss] the sheer simplicity of life in those days. There was a clearly defined enemy” (“Survey: Military Revolutions,” 
The Economist, 20 July, 2002, 7).   
19 See Stephen Brudiansky, Air Power (New York: Viking, 2004), chapter 14; Sebastian Cox and Peter 
Gray, Air Power History: Turning Points from Kitty Hawk to Kosovo (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2002), Parts III 
and IV; John Andreas Olsen, A History of Air Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2010), Part III.   
20 Shimko notes that it is difficult to determine the beginning/end of this RMA because it is “the first to be 
so extensively analyzed as it is supposedly unfolding” (Keith L. Shimko, The Iraq Wars and America’s Military 
Revolution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 21).    
21 Andrew Latham, “Re-imagining Warfare: The ‘Revolution in Military Affairs,” Contemporary Security 





 The change in security threat not only changes the type of war to be waged, but the 
adversary that it is to be waged against. 
 Revolutions in Military Affairs are certainly not a new or unique development to the 






 chronicle the 
emergence of technological innovations that so altered the battlefield that they required radical 
changes in military strategy and training. Focused on the mechanization of the battlefield, Martin 
van Creveld suggests that the trajectory of the RMA finds its roots in the ashes of World War II. 
“The most significant post-1945 technological developments took place in the field of electronics 
and space.”
26
 The consequent arms races of the Cold War produced expensive, virtually unusable 
stockpiles of nuclear weapons.
27
 As new challenges and conflicts developed, “big bomb” 
strategies were no longer viable. New technologies, applications of technological developments, 
and warfare strategies integrating precision were desirable.  
In his study, War Made New, Max Boot is clear that changes on the battlefield are 
reflective of factors inclusive of and beyond the military (social, economic, political, etc.). He 
notes that at a fundamental level the focus of RMA analysis should rest on “the soldier struggling 
to kill or avoid being killed, and [on] his commander struggling to master the remorseless logic 
of carnage.”
28
 The deliberate inclusion of the human into the RMA equation is also endorsed by 
                                               
22 Ibid., 222.  
23 Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).  
24 John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Vintage Books, 1993).  
25 Max Boot, War Made New: Weapons, Warriors, and the Making of the Modern World (Ne w York: 
Gotham Books, 2007). 
26 Martin van Creveld, “Strategic View: World War II’s Stifling Paradigm,” The Quarterly Journal of 
Military History, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Spring 2001), 51.  
27 Whether or not the proliferation of nuclear weapons create a more or less stable world is the subject of 
Sagan and Waltz’s book, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, but both scholar agree that the use of nuclear weaponry 
in warfare would be so horrible that containment and monitoring regimes to control these weapons are more likely 
than the utilization of these weapons (Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A 
Debate Renewed, (New York: Norton, 2003).  
28 Ibid., 11.  
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military historian, Adrian Lewis. Critiquing the wholesale acceptance of a defense development 
and deployment strategy characterized as technology-first, Lewis states: “Technology, 
operational doctrine, and new adaptive organization were to come together in ways that created 




At the heart of this RMA has been the development of casualty-averse technology such as 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. According to P.W. Singer, the present RMA is unique as “the 
introduction of unmanned systems to the battlefield doesn’t change simply how we fight, but for 
the first time changes who fights…It transforms the very agent of war, rather than just its 
capabilities.”
30
 This change in agent has additional implications for the role of the soldier and the 
Western understanding of war because, as Singer quips, “Drones don’t die.”
31
 Weapons like 
UAVs are designed to feed a casualty averse American public, “destroy[ing] [the enemy 




Half a year before the tragic 9/11 terrorist attacks and the United States’ incursion into 
Afghanistan, the nascent Bush Administration committed itself to development of a 
technologically-driven military that would reduce risk to soldiers through technologic 
advancements. In an address given to troops and personnel at Norfolk Naval Air Station on 
February 13, 2001, President George W. Bush noted: “We’re witnessing a revolution in the 
technology of war, powers increasingly defined not by size, but by mobility and 
swiftness…Safety is gained in stealth and forces projected on the long arc of precision-guided 
                                               
29 Adrian Lewis, The American Culture of War, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2012), 380.  
30 P. W. Singer, Wired For War (New York: Penguin, 2009), 194). Emphasis is mine.  
31 P. W. Singer, “Drones Don’t Die,” Military History, Vol. 28, No. 2 (July 2011), 66.  
32 Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2000), 169.  
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weapons. The best way to keep the peace is to redefine war on our terms.”
33
 It is this sentiment 
that cements the continuation of the RMA and the American-preferred “Casualty Averse” 
philosophy of military engagement. 
In order to properly understand what is meant by “casualty averse warfare,” it must be 
defined. Conceptually, casualty aversion is not complex. Robert Mandel describes casualty 
averse warfare as: “During warfare one has a low tolerance for losing many lives or suffering 
many injuries.”
34
 The very definition of casualty aversion is, however, laden with ambiguity as 
the nature of “many lives lost” is perceptual.
35
 Mandel notes that “the quest for bloodless war 
represents as aspiration embodying a set of sometimes unspoken or confusingly stated 
motivations, intentions, and values, rather than a pattern of unambiguous empirically observable 
behavior.”
36
 This defines the ideal of precise death in warfare of precise combatant targets 
without risk to soldiers or noncombatants not identified as targets, thus establishing a righteous 
justification for conflict. If assailants can attack enemy combatants with pinpoint accuracy, then 
the risk of collateral damage is decreased significantly.    
Casualty averse military strategies become attractive in a world of twenty-four hour news 
cycles and competition between cable news stations to break the latest news. American public 
support of military actions is directly tied to what is shown on their television screens. Ignatieff 
describes the Kosovo Conflict as “a spectacle: it aroused emotions in the intense but shallow way 
                                               
33 Bush, “Remarks by the President to the Troops and Personnel.”  
34 Robert Mandel, Security, Strategy, and the Quest for Bloodless War (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2004), 8.   
35 Coker suggests a deeply ingrained Western cultural norm that considers “a life lost [to be] a waste.” He 
links this cultural phenomenon to a collective inability to accept the risk and sacrifice associated with war and 
conflict. “One of the principle reasons we cannot justify casualties any longer is that we can no longer make sense of 
the waste of life in the complex situations that demand the use of force” (Christopher Coker, Waging War Without 
Warriors? (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 65). Essentially the Western culture is characterized by an 
impossible demand for peace without conflict. 





 American citizens become “armchair soldiers,” watching exploding bombs as 
spectators. Thus, Americans require images of victory to lend support to war. Fewer casualties 
translate to greater support by Americans for the military. This feeds an American culture with 
expectations for images of easy victories and few flag-draped coffins.
38
 Mandel explains, “So 
casualty aversion seems to be a virtually inevitable consequence because people would be upset 
if many of their fellow citizens were being slaughtered in battle.”
39
         
 The relationship between media and public support can clearly be observed through the 
media’s “ability to dramatize the costs of war.”
40
 What would become known as “the CNN 
Effect,” accounts for the ability of CNN (and all news media outlets) “to focus an audience’s 
attention,” thus “increas[ing] public pressure on political leaders.”
41
 The classic case for the 
CNN effect is the Vietnam War. It is largely believed that “the reason Vietnam casualties are still 
remembered today is because of their unprecedented visibility during the conflict.”
42
 The 
visualization of loss causes a conflict and the strategy by which it is being fought to face 
delegitimization in eyes of the public.      
Directly influencing change in American military strategy, the media’s portrayal of the 
United States’ Battle of Mogadishu in October of 1993 caused not only the swift abandonment of 
a ten month United Nations mission in Somalia, but also impacted the strategies utilized by 
NATO forces in the 1999 Kosovo conflict. After two Black Hawk transport helicopters were 
shot down by Somali militants, with initial reports of five dead American soldiers
43
 and bringing 
                                               
37 Ignatieff, 3.   
38 Martin Shaw, The New Western Way of War (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2005),79-80.  
39 Mandel, 13.   
40 Ibid., 18.  
41 Edward S. Herman and David Peterson, “CNN: Selling NATO’s War Globally,” Degraded Capability: 
The Media and the Kosovo Crisis, eds. Philip Hammond and Edward S. Herman (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 111.  
42 Mandel, 18.  
43 John H. Cushman Jr., “5 G.I.’s are Killed As Solis Down 2 U.S. Helicopters,” The New York Times, 4 
October 1993, sec. 1A, p. 1. This figure was later increased to 18 American soldiers killed.   
9 
 
the combat death toll in Somalia to sixteen.
44
 While the soldiers’ deaths were tragic in their own 
right, the reports and images of the Somali’s grisly treatment of the soldiers’ corpses and soldiers 
taken hostage caused the loss to be intolerable by the American people.  
News reports from Mogadishu…said the bodies of dead American 
soldiers littered the scene of the fighting, with the bloodied corpse 
of one U.S. serviceman being dragged through the streets by ropes 
tied to his feet, and another dead serviceman stripped naked and 
surrounded by a gleeful Somali mob chanting “Victory!”…In 
another case, the corpse of an American soldier was said to have 
been tied up and trundled through the streets on a wheelbarrow by 
about 200 cheering Somalis.
45
       
 
This intolerance was characterized rhetorically by the United States Congress, who were 
quick to link the operation in Somalia to controversial loss of soldiers in Vietnam
46
 and 
evidenced in a public opinion poll, which revealed that “43% [of those polled] say that they’re 
less willing to commit U.S. troops after the escalating violence in Somalia” and the same 
percentage believed that the United States should remove troops immediately. 59% of those 
polled had seen “news photos of the corpse of a U.S. solider being dragged through the streets by 
Aidid followers.”
47
 This incident marked the beginning of the end of the American military’s 
mission in Somalia, with formal withdrawal completed on March 25, 1994.
48
  
 The October 1993 battle in Mogadishu served as a backdrop for the spring 1999  
                                               
44 Tom Kenworthy and John Lancaster, “At Least 5 Americans Killed in Somali Attack; Two Army 
Helicopters Shot Down During U.N. Operation Against Warlord Aideed,” The Washington Post, 4 October 1993, 
sec. 1, p. A1.  
45 Keith B. Richburg, “Somalia Battle Killed 12 Americans, Wounded 78,” The Washing ton Post, 5 
October 1993, Sec. 1, pg. A1.  
46  Senator Ernest F. Hollings (D-SC) noted: “‘It’s Vietnam all over again’” and argued “for a quick 
withdrawal from Somalia,” arguing, “‘There’s no education in a second kick of a mule’” (Clifford Krauss, “White 
House Tries to Calm Congress,” The New York Times, 5 October 1993, Sec. A, pg. 16.) 
47 Richard Benedetto, “Poll: Most Now Say U.S. Troops Should Get Out,” USA Today, 6 October 1993, 
Sec. NEWS, pg. 2A.  
48 Keith B. Richburg, “U.S. Completes Pullout from Somalia,” The Washington Post, 25 March 1994, Sec. 
1, pg. A1.  
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United States-led, NATO air war against Yugoslavia. The impetus for the strikes was “an effort 
to halt and reverse the human rights abuses that were being committed against the citizens of its 
Kosovo province by Yugoslavia’s president, Slobodan Milosevic.”
49
 Using the recent history of 
ethnic cleansing and genocide in the Balkans and measurable success with targeted air strikes 
during the 1992-1995 Bosnian War,
50
 President Clinton stressed the aerial (casualty averse) 
nature of the campaign in Kosovo, while affirming its potential risks. 
Like any other military action—there are risks in it…There are 
risks every time our young people get up and fly jet airplanes at 
very high speeds…But the dangers of acting must be weighed 
against the dangers of inaction. If we don’t do anything after all the 
to-and-fro that’s been said here, it will be interpreted by Mr. 
Milosevic as a license to continue to kill. There will be more 
massacres, more refugees, more victims, more people crying out 
for revenge.
51
        
 
Commentators speculate that a contributing factor for Milosevic’s eventual surrender was 
the threat of ground troop deployment,
52
 but the images of the Somalia tragedy, stamped on the 
minds of the American public, would only permit a perceptually low-risk engagement for 
American troops in defense of Kosovo. Like other conflicts of the 1990s, the Kosovo Conflict 
was widely televised,
53
 but the lack of US troops on the ground prevented “battlefield reports” 
                                               
49 Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), xiii.  
50 See Chapter 14 of R.J. Crampton, The Balkans Since the Second World War (London: Pearson Education 
Limited, 2002).   
51 William Jefferson Clinton, “Excerpt from Remarks by President Clinton, March 23, 1999,” The Kosovo 
Conflict: A Diplomatic History Through Documents, eds. Philip E. Auerswald and David P. Auerswald, 
(Cambridge: Kluwer Law International, 2000), 699.  
52 Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo, 72. In an interview with James der Derian, General Wesley Clark 
discussed plans for escalation to ground troops had the air strikes been ineffective. “Well, we had a basic strategy: 
discuss an air threat, make an air threat; discuss a ground threat, make a ground threat, then invade. Each one built 
up to a greater coercive pressure” (Virtuous War, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2009), 189-190).  
53 James der Derian explores the expansion of the Bosnian campaign’s coverage to the internet. He notes 
that he “dipped in and out of the virtual Bosnia represented on the Web, moving through bulletin boards, booklists, 
home pages, electronic archives and even a ‘Bosnian Virtual Fieldtrip’ on the Internet” (52). The impact of the 
internet on warfare and information dissemination from the battlefield is a topic for another paper, but it should be 
acknowledged that media reporting extends beyond to what is read in print and seen on television screens into 
cyberspace.    
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from reporters. Thus, the US government was able to control the interpretation of the bombings, 
primarily through the portrayal of Milosevic’s war crimes as the problem.
54
 
A public resistant to the idea of combat deaths of their troops has aided in propelling the 
evolution of Western military strategy. Thus, this strategy is reliant upon air power in order to 
prevent heavy casualty conflict.
55
 In the end, Kosovo “did indeed represent the first time in 
which air power coerced an enemy leader to yield with no friendly land combat action 
whatsoever.”
56
 The NATO victory in Kosovo set a precedent for technology and air-power-
focused twenty-first century warfare.   
 A progressively casualty-averse strategy of warfare is propelled by technological 
developments that allow for soldiers to step back from the danger of battlefield, with the goal of 
increasing the strength and precision of weaponry.
57
 The ultimate intention is to “give the United 
States a battlefield edge against region powers, [and] will also bolster efforts to deal with such 
dangers as international crime, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and 
environmental damage.”
58
 In part, the edge that technology provides a military is speed of 
response.
59
 A vital technological advancement in today’s battlefield has been the development 
and use of UAVs for the purposes of surveillance and combat. 
 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, such as the USAF’s TQ-1A Predator and US Army’s Hunter, 
were first used for intelligence collection during the Kosovo Conflict.
60
 The tactical advantage of 
                                               
54 Mark Smith, The Kosovo Conflict: U.S. Diplomacy and Western Public Opinion (Los Angeles, CA: 
Figueroa Press, 2009), 17- 20. 
55 Boot, War Made New, 350. 
56 Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo, 224.  
57 Latham, 223.  
58 Thomas G. Mahnken and James R. FizSimonds, “Revolutionary Ambivalence: Understanding Officer 
Attitudes towards Transformation,” International Security, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Fall 2003), 121-122.  
59 Bruce M. Sugden, “Speed Kills: Analyzing the Deployment of Conventional Ballistic Missiles,” 
International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Summer 2009). 
60 See Singer’s “Drones Don’t Die” for an historical overview of UAV development from World War I to 
the Global War on Terror.   
12 
 
UAVs was quickly acknowledged as “UAVs offered commanders and planners the frequent 
advantage of real-time video imagery without any accompanying danger of aircrew losses.”
61
 
General Wesley Clark confirmed the utility of UAVs in combat in an interview with James der 
Derian, and advocated for continued development of the technology. 
What you needed was integration, of the digitized images from the 
unmanned aerial vehicle flying overhead, your map coordinates, 
and the geolocations of the enemy from the GPS, and to project it 
all on the thermal viewer, to use it as a computer, so the driver and 
the gunner know when they get to the top of the hill, they’ll know 
that the son-of-a-bitch is going to be right there.
62
        
 
While not fool-proof, the USAF was able to use three Predators with 24 hours of flight time, to 
simultaneously to map and identify targets for attack.
63
 Additionally, General Clark and his staff 




Prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the remote, rough terrain of Tora Bora of 
Afghanistan and Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the United States Department 
of Defense articulated an intention to further develop UAV capabilities. The 2001 Quadrennial 
Defense Review Report expressed the efficacy of UAVs for “intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance” (ISR).
65
 The value of UAVs for surveillance missions is undeniable. Unlike the 
Cold War surveillance standard, the U2 spy plane, the unmanned Global Hawk, slated to replace 
the U2 in 2015,
66
 can monitor targets for about 35 hours at an altitude of 65,000 feet without 
endangering a pilot. To put this in perspective, the “Global Hawk can fly from San Francisco, 
                                               
61  Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo, 94. 
62 Der Derian, 188-189.  
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65 Department of Defense, 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 30 September 2001, accessed 15 July 
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The surveillance provided by UAVs is remarkably crisp and, provided in real time, it 
eliminates the delay of photo and information transfer previously experienced through 
intelligence gathering methods such as human intelligence (HUMINT). In her seminal New 
Yorker article, journalist Jane Mayer described her experience watching as a Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) team surveyed and executed a strike on wanted Pakistani terrorist, Baituallah 
Mesud, through the assistance of a Predator Drone. “It was a hot summer night, and he [Mesud] 
was joined outside by his wife and his uncle, a medic; at one point, the remarkably crisp images 




While Predator Drones had been utilized to track the movements of al Qaeda terrorist, 
Osama bin Laden in October of 2000, prior to the 9/11 attacks, the Drones had not been 
weaponized and the CIA was forced to watch, frustrated, as bin Laden went about his daily tasks 
unhindered. “Here was the clean shot they had been seeking for more than two years: positive 
identification of their target, no questionable human agents, no delay.”
69
 Money to arm the 
Drones, however, was not immediately forthcoming. The 9/11 terrorist attacks propelled this 
technology forward.           
 
 For the purposes of warfare, the ability to equip UAVs with strike capabilities in order to 
access targets in remote or hidden areas has been an integral component of casualty averse 
strategies. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report expresses the necessity of weapons 
capabilities to be developed for UAVs in combat: “Emphasis must be placed on…unmanned 
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long-range precision strike assets, related initiatives for new small munitions, and the ability to 
defeat hard and deeply buried targets.”
70
 Shortly after the Global War on Terror had begun, 
President Bush praised the efficacy of armed UAVs and the necessity to further pursue 
unmanned technology.  
This combination -- real-time intelligence, local allied forces, 
special forces, and precision air power -- has really never been 
used before.  The conflict in Afghanistan has taught us more about 
the future of our military than a decade of blue ribbon panels and 
think-tank symposiums. The Predator is a good example. This 
unmanned aerial vehicle is able to circle over enemy forces, gather 
intelligence, transmit information instantly back to commanders, 
then fire on targets with extreme accuracy. Before the war, the 
Predator had skeptics, because it did not fit the old ways.  Now it is 
clear the military does not have enough unmanned vehicles.  We're 
entering an era in which unmanned vehicles of all kinds will take 




While concentration has clearly been upon casualty aversion for American service men 
and women, how does this military strategy account for the deaths of and injuries to civilians? At 
the time of writing, 2,319 U.S. service members have died in Operation Enduring Freedom since 
2001.
72
 While the deaths of these US service men and women are an indisputably tragic loss to 
the United States, the loss of life has been more substantial for Afghan civilians.
73
 The United 
Nations reports that from January 01, 2007 to December 31, 2012, 14,728 Afghan civilians have 
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The numbers of combatant and noncombatant casualties attributed to UAVs are also 
extremely lopsided. This is because the pilots of UAVs are not located within the physical 
geography of the battlefield, and, thus, combatants and noncombatants almost entirely absorb the 
casualties sustained through UAV attacks. Because casualty numbers resulting from UAV 
attacks are classified, reports vary wildly. While some sources report that 50 noncombatants are 
killed for every one militant,
75
 The New America Foundation claims that the rate between 
noncombatants and militants has never been that high
76
 and currently claim a civilian death toll 
of single digits in 2013 and zero in 2014. These numbers have come under scrutiny because they 
are limited by the numbers that are reported in the media, not by the real numbers that are 
collected by the US military and/or the Central Intelligence Agency.
77
   
Martin Shaw refers to the preservation of soldier safety while sacrificing noncombatant 
safety as “risk-transfer war.” This is “because it centers on minimizing life-risks to the 
military…at the expense not only of ‘enemies’ but also of those whom the West agrees are 
‘innocent’.”
78
 The ambiguity of casualty aversion is apparent: what is casualty averse for one 
group may not be casualty averse for another, but may, instead, be the transfer of risk from one 
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group onto another. The consequence of risk transfer warfare is the prioritization of the soldier 
protection over the protection of the other, inclusive of noncombatants.   
Recognition: Facilitating An Alternate Discourse 
 The dominant discourse of casualty averse warfare is not only strong, but has informed 
American military structure and research and development through the RMA. The emergence of 
alternative discourses is not driven by an alternative view of military structure, but, rather, access 
deep-set norms or expectations for the behavior of states in the international community. The 
goal of a critical theory such as discourse ethics is to expose the inadequacies and injustices 
present within the status quo in favor of an approach that better adheres to socially-established 
norms. While Habermas contends that this can be accomplished through the availability of 
discursive opportunities and the praxis of discourse, Habermas’ protégé, Axel Honneth, contends 
that discourse alone is insufficient in facilitating resolution in the face of conflict. This is because 
conflict between two parties is often a result of power inequalities between them. Thus, discourse 
is reliant upon the precondition of recognition.  
Honneth describes the a priori necessity of mutual recognition between parties in order 
for an individual or group’s humanity to be respected. 
Every human subject is dependent in an elementary way, on a 
context of social forms of interaction that are regulated by 
normative principles of mutual recognition; and the absence of 
such recognition relations will be followed by experience of 
disrespect or humiliation that cannot be without damaging 
consequences for the single individual’s identity formation.
79
 
      
 In the case of clear power differentiations, such as those observed between 
noncombatants and military powers in conflict, discourse is not possible without the deliberate 
recognition of personhood, rights, and the existence of perceived grievance by all discursive 
                                               




parties. “The politics of recognition,” according to Shapcott are ultimately ontological. 
Recognition “refers not only to people’s relationships to the things of the world but to their 
fundamental modes of being-in-the-world.”
80
 The process of recognition, followed by the 
practice of discourse, is fundamentally the practice of empathy, or as some feminist theorists 
have put it, of care.
81
 Recognition-driven discourse, thus, “requires participants to put themselves 
in the place of all others potentially affected by a candidate norm, in order to see whether or not 
it can be welcomed from their perspective too.”
82
     
 
 In a culture that values precision and expediency of weapons in conflict under the 
umbrella of “casualty averse” warfare, Habermasian discourse ethics, augmented by Honneth’s 
theory of recognition and Judith Butler’s grievable life, provides helpful insight into the plight of 
noncombatants who find themselves unjustly in a UAV pilot’s cross-hairs. Chapter One of this 
project looks at Jürgen Habermas’ theory of discourse ethics, how it fits into constructivist 
International Relations scholarship, evaluates its shortcomings, and suggests ways to build upon 
its discursive foundations for easier applicability. Chapter Two considers the voicelessness of 
noncombatants in UAV warfare and suggests that through recognition and transnational 
discourses that challenge the dominant narrative, noncombatants can move beyond the 
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Chapter 1:  
Justice, Discourse, and Recognition: Habermas and International Relations 
  
 Richard Shapcott begins his book Justice, Community, and Dialogue in International 
Relations with the assertion that understanding justice in the international system is essentially 
“an impossible task.”
83
 This sentiment is echoed by David Campbell. “Justice is like the pre-
original, anarchic relation to the other, and to the undecidable. It represents the domain of the 
impossible and the unrepresentable that lies outside and beyond the limit of the possible and 
representable.”
84
 From these perspectives, it seems that the study of justice in International 
Relations might be fruitless. That does not seem to deter us, however, from exploring theoretical 
venues through which justice might be more holistically realized for more of humanity, 
especially those who are marginalized and/or oppressed.  
 Some political philosophers and political documents suggest that justice can best be 
realized through a top-down mandate from the state or through a legal code.
85
 Alternatively, and 
relevant for this analysis, others have concluded that justice is best achieved through a grass 
roots, bottom-up approach. For example, Rawls’ contention that the practice of justice begins at 
the theoretical first position and from behind a Veil of Ignorance so “that no one is advantaged or 
disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or contingency of 
social circumstances.”
86
 Walzer suggests that justice within warfare is determined by the 
consensus, not of the war-wagers, but of humanity.
87
 Concepts of justice, thus, are understood as 
constituted through human intersubjectivity and inclusivity. This process is facilitated most 
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obviously through communication. “Dialogue may result in the expansion and/or reconfiguration 
of moral boundaries…because the principle of communication is universally inclusive: no agent 
capable of communication can be ruled out in principle.”
88
   
International relationships are fundamentally driven by meaning-laden communication or 
speech acts. Utterances are performative actions, wrought with meaning, that evoke response, 
after interpretation, from the receiver of the speech.
89
 Risse notes the “triviality” of this assertion, 
noting that “communicative behavior is all-pervasive in international relations as in any other 
social setting.”
90
 But, he continues, there is a difference between instrumental “cheap talk” and 
deliberative argumentation or “rhetorical action.”
91
 The difference is rooted in the purpose 
underpinning the communication. Habermas refers to the purpose of these speech acts as 
establishing “validity claims” or mutually-agreed-upon understandings of reality and norms. 
Finlayson explains: “Human actions are always primarily coordinated by speech or language 
use…Validity claims have a practical function, since they guide the actions of social agents.”
92
   
Additionally, the practice of discourse in search of understanding is a process through 
which validity claims can be established and altered. This occurs on the international level both 
through formal discourse such as diplomatic negotiation and through less formal public 
discourse, which informs the international public sphere. The public square provides an 
intentional check upon the actions of political actors. “The existence of a public sphere ensures 
that actors have to regularly and routinely explain and justify their behavior.”
93
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The relevance of a discursive approach to International Relations theory seems apparent. 
Even the (essentialized) realist International Relations theorist who argues that it is exclusively 
the acquisition and execution of material power that establishes activity within the international 
system,
94
 might find some promise in discursive theoretical traditions as the actions and words 
that states undertake are symbolic of power-laden discourse. Considering, for example, the 
quintessentially realist Melian dialogue transcribed by Thucydides,
95
 it is apparent that Athenian 
power ultimately triumphed over Melian desire for neutrality.
96
 The anecdote itself is encased in 
discourse, action, and reaction.
97
 
This chapter will, first, explain the ontology and discourse ethics of Jürgen Habermas. 
Second, it will review the International Relations literature in order to establish the utility of 
discourse ethics for the study of international politics. Finally, it will evaluate a selection of 
critiques of Habermas’ work and explore ways that discourse ethics can be augmented in order to 
be most useful for this study.    
Habermas’ Ontology: Lifeworld and System 
 A chief concern of International Relations theory is an articulation of the ontological 
presuppositions both of the utilized theoretical approach and of the researcher.  Jackson notes 
that “what is at stake in the contrast between ‘explaining’ and ‘understanding’ is not the 
character of the world, but rather how we observers are hooked up to it.”
98
 The Habermasian 
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ontology is important not only because it situates the scholar within Habermas’ theoretical 
presuppositions, but also because it provides context for the transformative significance of 
communication within his vision the world.
99
     
In his seminal two-volume work The Theory of Communicative Action, Jürgen Habermas 
takes great care to explain and develop his understanding of the composition of the world. 
Articulating opposition to Popperian positivism and belief in an objective, discoverable truth 
“out there,” Habermas describes three worlds within which “the actor takes up relations with his 
utterance.”
100
 These three “worlds” consisting of the objective world (possible truth statements), 
the social world (interpersonal relationships), and the subjective world (a speaker’s unique 
experiences) inform Habermas’ ontological presuppositions.
101
  
Habermas breaks down his representation of the social world further into two spheres that 
simultaneously constitute society: the lifeworld and the system.
102
 Despite the differentiations 
between these social levels, Habermas is clear that they are both presupposed by “normatively 
regulated action.”
103
 It is through this ontological envisioning of the world that communication 
transpires.  “Communicative action presupposes language as the medium for a kind of reaching 
understanding, in the course of which participants, through relating to a world, reciprocally raise 
validity claims that can be accepted or contested.”
104
 Thus, it is the people within the world that 
compose, sustain, and change it through discursive praxis. 
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 The first part of Habermas’ division of the world is the system.
105
 The system itself is a 
fairly regimented, sedimentary structure that Habermas designates as being driven by two 
material mechanisms exchange (or money) and power.
106
 These mechanisms provide the basis 
for social stratification such as “state organization in forms of political domination 
and…relations between private legal persons.”
107
 Because the rigidity of the institutions at the 
system level become so pervasive for the functionality of everyday life, these structures can 
actually “colonize” the socially-driven lifeworld causing “agents [to] fall naturally into pre-
established patterns of instrumental behavior.”
108
 These patterns actually restrict the potential for 
communicative action “instead of making it possible in the first place.”
109
  
The process of reintegrating colonized portions of the lifeworld can be lengthy and 
difficult, forcing reconfiguration of the system’s institutions through concerted discursive 
efforts.
110
 One need only think about the generations-long fight to abolish the slave trade in 
eighteen and nineteenth century Great Britain and the United States to see a clear illustration of 
the difficulty in changing system-level legal and economic structures and converting them into 
social, ethical discussions.
111
 Crawford refers to this process of systemic change as overcoming 
extrinsic barriers and notes: “An argument may overcome extrinsic barriers when the culture and 
the institution where the arguments occur are open to challenge.” She goes on to explain that the 
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“Domestic and international institutions designed to facilitate democratic deliberation may lower 
the extrinsic barrier to argument, by increasing the ability of different actors to participate.
112
 
Such inclusive participation occurs, Habermas contends, at the level of the lifeworld.    
The second part of the Habermasian ontological world is the lifeworld (or social world), 
which exists prior to the system. Central to the lifeworld is a “normative context that lays down 
which interactions belong to the totality of legitimate interpersonal relations.”
113
 These 
relationships include “the informal and unmarketized domains of social life”
114
 such as the 
family and culture. Central to the existence of the lifeworld are language and culture, which are 




 Resulting from these existing linguistic patterns, Habermas considers the lifeworld to be 
a universal commonality to the point that it cannot be transcended or exited by communicative 
actors. The lifeworld provides the context within which situations that require discursive 
mediation occur. Habermas explains: “The lifeworld forms the setting which situational horizons 
shift, expand, or contract. It forms a context that, itself boundless, draws boundaries.”
116
 This 
presupposition of boundedness and commonality provides actors with a referential linguistic 
system permitting mutual understanding between discursive parties. Habermas asserts that 
“speakers and hearers come to an understanding from out of the common lifeworld about 
something in the objective, social or subjective worlds.”
117
 Habermas does provide space for 
differing definitions of terms and concepts and suggests that part of the initial discursive process 
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is dependent upon determining accepted definitions. Without consensus on terms and definitions 
between parties, discourse cannot continue and will not be efficacious.   
 Embedded within the commonality of the lifeworld are established, universalized norms. 
Habermas suggests that it is out of these established norms that cultural values are realized. 
“Members can then expect of one another that in corresponding situations each of them will 
orient his action to values normatively prescribed for all concerned.”
118
 The contention that 
norms are dialogically constituted and impact human behavior aligns itself nicely with the 
ontological and theoretical premises of constructivist international relations theory. It is now to 
this body of literature that we turn.  
Constructivism and Habermasian Discourse 
One of the core goals of the constructivist approach to International Relations seeks to 
understand how societal norms are established and sustained, while simultaneously establishing 
and sustaining the identities of individuals and collectives. Wendt explains that “particular 
identities vary, but each identity is an inherently social definition of the actor grounded in the 
theories which actors collectively hold about themselves and one another and that constitute the 
structure of the social world.”
119
 Thus, when identity formation and sustenance is a key 
theoretical consideration, understanding the creation of relational meaning becomes important. 
Kloz characterizes shared meanings and norms as intersubjective. “Particular meanings become 
stable over time, creating social orders that constructivists call structures or institutions. Rules 
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and norms set expectations about how the world works, what types of behavior are legitimate, 
and which interests or identities are possible.”
120
 
While the formation of identity is a complicated topic and ultimately beyond the bounds 
of this project, it is important to tie it in to the social processes that humans continuously engage 
in. Aristotle famously categorized humans as political animals and linked their humanity to their 
engagement with and in the polis. “Anyone who cannot form a community with others, or who 
does not need to because he is self-sufficient, is no part of a city-state—he is either a beast or a 
god.”
121
 Thus, it follows that identity can be envisioned as a political process.
122
 ‘ 
A key social and political practice vital in both norm and identity production is 
communication. Kratochwil links communication with the development of meaning and practice 
directing norms in society. He notes that a central part of constructivist International Relations 
research requires the scholar to “understand how the social world is intrinsically linked to 
language and how language, because it is a rule-governed activity, can provide us with a point of 
departure for our inquiry into the function of norms in social life.”
123
 Habermas speaks similarly 
to the mutually constitutive nature of norms as discursively produced and behaviorally 
maintained. “Norms express an agreement that obtains in a social group…The central concept of 
complying with a norm means fulfilling a generalized expectation of behavior.”
124
 Habermas, as 
discussed above, contends that norms become entrenched into the fabric of a society’s lifeworld, 
thus becoming universalized and establishing a common foundation for discourse to occur.       
 
                                               
120 Audie Klotz and Cecelia Lynch, Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations 
(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2007), 8.  
121 Aristotle, Politics, transl. C.D.C. Reeve (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998), 5.  
122  Xavier Guillaume, International Relations and Identity (New York: Routledge, 2011), 21.  
123 Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 
6.  
124  Habermas  The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1, 85. 
26 
 
Habermas, International Relations, and the Insufficiencies of Discourse Ethics 
In its January 2005 issue, the Review of International Studies asked whether or not the 
engagement of international relations scholars with Habermas is “a useful dialogue” and 
advances the development of critical theory.
125
 While the consensus of the contributing scholars 
to this specific forum and a number of theorists published since, see the benefit of applying 
Habermas’ theories to International Relations, they are cautious about the extent to which “pure” 
Habermas can be utilized, acknowledging a number of insufficiencies in his theoretical 
framework when applied to specific cases.  
First, however, we should address the scholars of International Relations who have found 
Habermas to be helpful and have found some success in applying his principles to cases. 
Habermas has been used to explore the utility of rhetoric in International Relations
126
 and to 
support universal norm commonalities concurring with the lifeworld concept.
127
 Speaking to 
critics of Habermas, Risse suggests: “The preconditions for argumentative rationality, 
particularly a ‘common lifeworld’ and the mutual recognition of speakers as equals in a 
nonhierarchical relationship, are more common in international relations than is usually 
assumed.”
128
 Deitelhoff and Müller find that the “lifeworld” is already present, at least in a 
“thin” form, in the international system. “There is more of a lifeworld in international politics 
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than conventionally assumed: there exist frames of reference in international law, diplomatic 
customs, and shared history in which speakers anchor their arguments.”
129
 
 Andrew Linklater produces a compelling case for the use of Habermasian discourse 
ethics within International Relations. Acknowledging the potential for an international dialogical 
community, he concedes that powerful states engaging in dialogue with less powerful states must 
be cognizant and tolerant of cultural and moral differences. He asserts, however, that “only 
through dialogue with other cultures can progress be made in separating merely local truth from 
those with wider acclaim.”
130
 He goes on to argue that Habermas’ project is ultimately one that 
provides emancipation for those engaged in discourse.
131
 Linklater goes on to defend the use of 
Habermas in International Relations literature stating that, “it opposes totalizing projects that ride 




The criticism of Habermas within political theory and the international relations literature 
is, however, pervasive. A primary criticism of Habermasian discourse ethics is its situation 
within the definite structures of the lifeworld and system. Despite his criticism of positivist 
epistemologies, which establish objective truth as something that can be discovered though 
human reason, Habermas seems to unintentionally perpetuate a positivist understanding of the 
world in a “softer” sense.
133
 He accomplishes this through his inclusion both of the objective 
world and the system portion of the social world. Both are almost set sedimentary structures that 
are difficult to alter. Additionally, Habermas’ contention that norms are universalizable in the 
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lifeworld (permitting discourse), is premised on the presupposition of interests that can and 
should be held by all participating agents. Positivists suggest that truth can be uncovered through 
scientific discovery,
134
 and, likewise, Habermas suggests that validity claims can be discovered 
through discursive efforts.
135
 A markable difference between social scientific positivism and 
Habermasian discourse ethics is a concentration on creation (through language and dialogue) 
underpinned by universally recognized norms, rather than scientific discovery underpinned by 
objective truth. 
Habermas’ “soft” structuralism is further complicated by its reliance upon Western, 
liberal assumptions and language. Habermas is unapologetically dependent on his German 
intellectual forefather, Immanuel Kant, desiring for his analysis to continue and complete “the 
(unfinished) philosophical project of the Enlightenment…a project that, represented by Kant 
among others, aims to locate, and so benefit from the ideal ethical potential in rational human 
beings, while significantly remaining faithful to the sovereign state.”
136
 This is especially evident 
in Habermas’ publications on supranational and global governance discussing “political action 
on the scale of the planet”
137
 and institutionalized cosmopolitanism through the 
“constitutionalization of international law.”
138
 
Maintaining his structural presuppositions, Habermas couches his concept of public 
sphere discourse, maintaining a classic Westphalian conception of the state. Political theorist 
Nancy Fraser “problematizes” this liberal-Western assumption: “In this model, democracy 
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requires the generation, through territorially bounded processes of public 
communication…[requiring] the mobilization of public opinion as a political force.”
139
 The 
problem with a state-focused understanding of the world is further explained by poststructuralist 
David Campbell who observes that “our political imagination has been impoverished by the 
practices associated with the paradigm of sovereignty…In terms of the political field, this has 




The implications of a presupposed Westphalian-state-oriented international system 
include an abridgement of transnational communication and social mobilization’s impact on 
domestic and global political movements, which is characteristic of globalization.
141
 “Where 
such structures transgress the borders of states, the corresponding public spheres must be 
transnational. Failing that, the opinion that they generate cannot be considered legitimate.”
142
 
The problem of legitimacy in a Westphalian international system is further explained by Steele 
and Armoureux who suggest that the exclusionary nature of this system is “isolating…the 
influence that non-state actors, since they are not legitimate members, can and have had upon the 
content of those principles.”
143
 
Additionally, the presupposition of a Westphalian international system perpetuates an 
ethnocentric, liberal-concept-laden use of language. This ultimately entrenches power 
differentiations between discourse partners that Habermas neglects to acknowledge, maintaining 
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that lifeworld norms are universal in nature.
144
 The extension of liberal language into discourse 
ethics also extends meanings and practices representing inequality. Notably, Habermas’ 
understanding of democracy does not “adequately address issues of particular significance to 
Third World politics: the legacies of colonialism, the West’s hegemony in current global 
politics…and the impact of material conditions and socioeconomic (in)equality on democratic 
politics.”
145
 Additionally, we see the perpetuation of “political modalities—such as strength, 
resolution, boldness, will, and vigilance—associated with the regime of Masculine/feminine.”
146
 
These inequalities are especially problematic for the alleged egalitarian preconditions of 
Habermasian discourse ethics. 
One of the staunchest critiques of Habermas comes from feminist scholars who are 
concerned about the perpetuation of discriminatory social and cultural practices that restrict the 
participation of women and other minority groups in public discourse. Fraser is intentional to 
note the continued presence of inequalities today. “Socioeconomic injustice and cultural injustice 
are pervasive in contemporary societies. Both are rooted in processes and practices that 
systematically disadvantage some groups vis-à-vis others.”
147
 Robinson articulates the difficulty 
of uprooting and/or transforming these inequalities because they “reflect structures and 
institutions that are enduring (although not timeless) as well as persistent values and beliefs.”
148
  
Consequently, it seems that these values are established norms within particular 
lifeworlds and would only be replicated within the practice of Habermasian discourse. In fact, 
Hutchings argues that “the lifeworld/system distinction and the role of the public sphere in 
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modernity does little to challenge the liberal private/public distinction.”
149
 Kapoor affirms that 
the perpetuation of private/public sphere gender roles remains an important consideration in 
nonwestern cultures as well. “Transcendence of the ethical/personal can end up legitimizing 
women’s oppression in the home and prevent the problem from being addressed and resolved in 
the political/public sphere.”
150
 In gender-oppressive cultures in which women are expected to be 
seen and not heard, even the presence of women at the table does not guarantee their 




Despite the shortcomings of Habermas’ discourse ethics from a feminist perspective, 
some feminist theorists consider Habermas to possess analytical promise. Benhabib suggests that 
despite the strong language of Habermas’ requirement for unanimous consensus following 
discourse, “This requirement is still useful for understanding how the logic of universalizing 
justice claims differs from the logic of strategic as well as ethically specific claims. Discourses 
are moral and political learning processes.”
152
 Additionally, Benhabib acknowledges the 
importance of balancing the universality of human rights with the particularity of culture, which 
she believes to have been developed in international politics through discourse.
153
 While 
Hutchings is ultimately critical of Habermas, she does concede the role of his theories in the 
“broadening of the canvas of International Relations to include social and normative theory.”
154
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Recognition and War: Building Upon Habermas 
 While the critiques against Habermas’ discursive ethics are serious, Benhabib’s above 
assertion that the platform of discourse, given a proper framework, can lead to greater 
understanding between discursive partners is promising. It is clear that Habermas’ theory alone is 
insufficient in facilitating egalitarian communication especially between agents with clear power 
differentiations and that involved, transnational non-state actors must be intentionally included 
within the discursive practice if resolution to injustice and narrative discord are to be reached. As 
Rustin concludes regarding Habermas, “One must look elsewhere in order to locate an 
‘inclusive’ ethical theory that might motivate individuals toward greater respect for ‘others’ as 
fellow human beings.”
155
 Rustin’s analysis could also be elevated  to the group level, asserting 
that states and their representatives must be motivated to recognize the humanity of the other.  
A potential solution to the feminist and poststructuralist critiques of Habermas is to use 
additional theorists, in the vein of Habermas, to build upon the theoretical foundation formed by 
his discourse ethics. I propose that this can be accomplished by taking a step back from the 
public sphere and establishing an a priori inclusionary practice of recognition. Axel Honneth’s 
Theory of Recognition gives us a theoretical path towards the intentional inclusion of the 
other.
156
 Additionally, Judith Butler’s theory of grievable life provides us with unique insight 
into the power that humans possess to provide or deny recognition of the other in conflict zones. 
Using Honneth and Butler to build upon Habermas gives us a richer picture of how a dominant, 
power-driven discourse might be altered through recognition and justice-driven sub-discourses. 
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This is especially beneficial as we turn to the relevance of recognition to casualty averse warfare 

























Casualty Averse For Whom? Noncombatant Casualties, Ambiguous Justice, and 
Recognition in Drone Warfare 
 
Fire leaped from the dragon’s jaws. He circled for a while high in 
the air above them lighting all the lake; the trees by the shores 
shone like copper and like blood with leaping shadows of dense 
black at their feet. Then down he swooped straight through the 
arrow storm, reckless in his rage, taking no heed to turn his scaly 
sides towards his foes, seeking only to set their town ablaze. Fire 
leaped from thatched roofs and wooden beam-ends as he hurtled 
down and past and round again…Flames unquenchable sprang 





“Everyone is scared and they can’t get out of their house without 
any tension and fear of drone attacks. People are mentally 
disturbed as a result of the drone flights. We can’t sleep because of 
the planes’ loud sound. Even if they don’t attack we still have the 
fear of attack on our mind.” 




 Flying quietly through the air, often unseen, dragons, the mythical creatures of the 
fantasy genre, stalk their prey with destructive intent. Striking without warning, like Tolkein’s 
Smaug, they breathe fire and possess nearly impenetrable scaly shields. They are characterized 
by stealth and precision, often lacking discernment between combatant and innocent. In many 
ways, weaponized Unmanned Aerial Vehicles are modern, mechanized dragons. They are armed 
with hellfire missiles, quietly collecting surveillance, striking with precise, fiery explosions, 
without warning, when “signature” targets emerge. Their distance from their targets makes them 
difficult to neutralize by combatants. While every attempt is made by military personnel for 
discernment between combatant and noncombatant targets, mistakes are made and 
noncombatants become collateral damage. UAVs are perceived on the ground as omnipresent, 
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producing anxiety that everyone in the besieged community could be at risk of a swift, fiery 
death.
159
        
The utilization of UAVs in armed combat is designed to prevent risk to American and 
NATO troops, while targeting combatants with greater precision and efficacy than previous air-
based attack methods.
160
 The result, however, is a tactic of warfare that can seem indiscriminate 
and increases physical insecurities and psychological pressures of noncombatants living under 
the perpetual threat of death from the skies.
161
 If we understand this conflict and the utilization of 
UAVs to be situated within the transnational community, then the emergent critical discourses 
aiming to challenge dominant discourses should be engaged. At root, these subversive discourses 
are concerned with the un-administration of global justice to noncombatants targeted (with intent 
or inadvertently) and reduced to the status of “collateral damage.”
162
 In this environment of 
insecurity, the pursuit of global justice has taken a backseat to battlefield efficacy and casualty 
aversion as wartime risk is deliberately shifted from soldiers and placed upon noncombatants. 
The Public Sphere, Discourse, and the Internet 
The transnational nature of warfare causes it to be a contentious topic within the 
international community. International dependence at economic and political levels results in 
mutual dependence for international security. Within the context of what Habermas refers to as 
“the decline in the state’s capacities for control,”
163
 he also argues for the “transformation of the 
state power”
164
 that deepens international relations through “the constitutionalization of 
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international law…bound up with a supplementation of powers of national governments by a 
growing web of international organizations that make governance beyond the nation-state 
possible.
165
 But, this also requires that states in the international community understand 
themselves within the context of the international community. “States,” according to Habermas, 
“can no longer regard themselves exclusively as sovereign, contracting subjects.”
166
 They must 
consider themselves to be full members of the international community, adhering to the precepts 
of international law and norms, especially within the context of conflict.  
While the difficulties of this position from a critical perspective are discussed above, the 
premises of the transnational and interconnected nature of international relations is readily 
applicable to transnational dominant and subversive discourses on security issues, such as the use 
of weaponized UAVs in combat, occurring within a global public sphere.   
Habermas’ understanding of the public sphere has its roots deep in the Western tradition, 
going back to the Greek polis. Habermas defines the public sphere as the symbolic and physical 
place where “private people come together as a public” in order to debate and challenge “the 
general rules governing relations” in society. In short, this becomes “people’s public use of their 
reason.”
167
 The public sphere, thus, facilitates practice of ethical discourse “for disputing parties 
in the lifeworld.”
168
 At the domestic level, Putnam has referred to the public sphere as “civil 
society,” which sustains and further develops democratization through public participation in 
formal and informal civic organizations.
169
 Globally, this concept has been referred to as the 
“international society” held together by a set of commonly adhered to rules and characterized by 
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“a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of the society of states, or 
international society.”
170
 For the international society to be successful, it is reliant upon a 




 While Putnam bemoans the perceived decline of domestic civil society and of democratic 
participation in the United States,
172
 the public sphere has been digitized and expanded 
transnationally. “The public sphere, according to some, has been purified and reborn in the 
virtual realm. Citizens publically connect to networks of other citizens via the Internet and 
participate in rational debate and exchange.”
173
 The digitization of the public sphere has allowed 
for the emergence of transnational advocacy networks that are generally informal “sets of actors 
linked across country boundaries, bound together by shared values, dense exchanges of 
information and service, and common discourses.”
174
 
 The digital public sphere, especially characterized by social media websites and 
applications, provides a forum for pervasive, inclusive informative and dialogical exchange that 
can be utilized for social mobilization. The prominence of mobile devices with data capabilities 
makes communication even more prolific. “Already more than half of mobile phone users access 
the Internet from their [mobile] device” and this number will only increase.
175
 The prevalence 
and availability of social media has led to a trend of “tech activism” through which participants 
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possess “an impulse towards the creation of alternatives in reaction to structural injustice.”
176
 
Social media applications such as Twitter facilitate the creation of succinct statements that can be 




 The internet and its communicative possibilities presents a brave, new (life)world for 
Habermasian discourse ethics. This lifeworld is open to those with shared communication 
platforms, shared language (though visual representation of ideas can mitigate language 
barriers), and traversing traditional international boundaries. The internet provides “Habermas’ 
theory of communication” with deliberate “access to an emancipatory sphere of action.”
178
 In 
this way, Habermasian discourse ethics seem to align with the goals and processes of social 
media-based activism as “subjects encounter each other within the horizons of normative 
expectations whose disappointment becomes a constant source of moral demands.”
179
 The 
exchange of ideas through internet platforms is a way by which subversive discourses can be 
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Recognition and Discourse Ethics 
 
The dominant discourse of casualty averse, thus risk transfer, warfare establishes a space 
between the justice that is normatively expected by the international community, and the justice 
that is received by the noncombatant affected by this strategy of warfare. How can this gap 
between expected and experienced justice for the noncombatant be filled? We can discover some 
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helpful insight from the critical theories of Axel Honneth
180
 and Judith Butler,
181
 whose 
theoretical perspectives acknowledge the importance of recognition and grievable life 
(respectively). Taken in tandem, within the context of Habermas’ discourse ethics, these theories 
suggest a framework through which the justice of noncombatants in contemporary warfare might 
be holistically articulated.  
 Responding to what he views as the applicability insufficiencies of Habermas’ theory of 
communication, Axel Honneth suggests that “the presupposition of all communicative action is 
to be seen in the acquisition of social recognition.”
182
 Thus, Honneth’s theory of recognition and 
justice seeks to confront previous trends in political philosophy to either concede the pursuit of 
global justice as unattainable, thus forcing the theorist to “muddle through” tough examples of 
injustice, often tacitly excusing them, or to link justice to citizenship (local and/or global), which 
alienates those disenfranchised by the global community.
183
 
 Honneth, heavily influenced by the phenomenological work of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 
Hegel, understands recognition to be a mutually-constitutive process through which individuals 
share existential validation. Honneth characterizes Hegel’s view of recognition as being 
fundamental to the actualization of the self. “A subject can only arrive at a ‘consciousness’ of its 
own ‘self’ if it enters into a relationship of ‘recognition’ with another subject.”
184
 Once 
recognition is achieved, it is protected through intentional praxis of social order and law.
185
  
Thus, it is through participation in community that an individual is able to realize the full 
extent of his/her humanity “by being gradually assured of the specific abilities and needs 
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constituting his or her personality through the approving patterns of reaction by generalized 
interaction partners.” This experience is global in the reality that “every human being is 
dependent in an elementary way, on a context of social forms of interaction that are regulated by 
normative principles of mutual recognition.” Lack of mutual recognition generates patterns of 
“disrespect or humiliation that cannot be without damaging consequences for the single 
individual’s identity formation.”
186
 Thus, injustice occurs when “human subjects are denied the 
recognition they feel they deserve,” experiencing “feelings of social disrespect.”
187
 
Honneth’s theory develops three principles of recognition (love, equality, and merit)
188
 
which correspond with practical “spheres” that can measure justice: “responsiveness to need, 
legal equality or justice to achievements.”
189
 Injustice can be realized in society when these 
spheres are not adequately recognized within an individual’s context. 
 Similarly, Judith Butler suggests that it is through human interaction that one’s humanity 
is socially understood. This causes one’s life to be precarious, which suggests the vulnerability 
of one’s life in relation to others. “One’s life is always in some sense in the hands of the 
other…Grievability is a presupposition for the life that matters.”
190
 Humans, especially within 
the context of war are situated within physical and psychological spaces of insecurity, causing 
them to experience fundamental levels of vulnerability. “Loss and vulnerability seem to follow 
from our being socially constituted bodies, attached to others, at risk of losing those attachments, 
exposed to others, at risk of violence by virtue of that exposure.”
191
 Thus, for Butler, the fully 
realized life is the life that we mourn individually and corporately.  
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 In the face of warfare, this is difficult, however, as public narratives are constructed to 
dehumanize and delegitimize the lives of combatants and noncombatants alike. According to 
Butler “such populations are ‘lose-able,’ or can be forfeited, precisely because they are framed as 
being already lost or forfeited; they are cast as threats to human life as we know it rather than as 
living populations in need of protection from illegitimate state violence.”
192
 Butler also seems to 
understand this within the language of risk transfer warfare, concluding that through the 
incorporation of otherizing frames that present the stories of those within war-contexts to be 
fundamentally different than one’s own,
193
 “the loss of such populations is deemed necessary to 
protect the lives of ‘the living.’”
194
 
The Stanford/NYU and Amnesty International reports present the lives of those impacted 
by drone-based warfare to be difficult and infiltrated with insecurity and fear that they might be 
the next victims of a drone strike. The Amnesty International report quotes a resident of a North 
Waziristan village that has been under threat not only by the Taliban and al Qaeda forces, but, 
consequently, also by American drone activity. “‘Everyone is scared and they can’t get out of 
their house without any tension and from the fear of drone attacks…We can’t sleep because of 
the planes’ loud sound. Even if they don’t attack we still have the fear of attack in our mind.’”
195
  
 The NGO drone reports seem to elucidate an abridgement of the justice expected by 
Honneth’s first sphere of recognition, basic human need. People possess an intrinsic need to feel 
safe so that they are able to go about their lives’ pursuits without fear of imminent death. The 
frequent tactical use of drones makes it difficult, if not impossible, for individuals living in areas 
heavily impacted by drone strikes. This is further complicated by the violent, unexpected deaths 
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of noncombatants in these locations. For example, the Amnesty International report details the 
death of a grandmother who was killed by a drone strike in October of 2012 while harvesting 
okra in a field with four of her grandchildren nearby. “Before her family’s eyes, Mamana Bibi 




 Additionally, drone strikes reportedly prevent their victims from pursuing economic and 
academic advancement, causing Honneth’s third sphere of recognition, achievement, to be 
unrecognized. A student who became disabled by a drone strike that hit his house, killing his 
father—the breadwinner for the family, tells the Living Under Drones researcher that he is no 
longer able to continue his studies because of his injuries. Additionally, he laments the fact that 
his disability (a lost leg) prevents him from working. Thus, his younger brothers are unable to 




 There is a cultural component to drone warfare as well. Reports show how drone warfare 
has entrenched itself within the cultural discourse of drone-targeted cultures. “The mothers 
used…to tell their kids: Go to sleep or I will call your father. Now, instead, they say: Go [to] 
sleep or I will call the plane.”
198
 Living Under Drones researcher Jennifer Gibson argues that 
drone warfare is systematically destroying communities in areas targeted by, especially, 
weaponized UAVs. “Parents are afraid to send their children to school. Women are afraid to 
meet in markets. Families are afraid to gather at funerals for people wrongly killed in earlier 
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strikes. Drivers are afraid to deliver food from other parts of the country. The routines of daily 
life have been ripped to shreds.”
199
    
 Habermas considers justice experienced by individuals to be not “something material, not 
a determinate ‘value,’ but a dimension of validity.”
200
 Honneth explains this validity to be 
underpinned by recognition of the other, while Butler suggests that this sort of recognition is 
informed by the grievability that one attributes to the other. In case of noncombatants affected 
physically and/or psychologically by the omnipresence of UAVs in their contexts, their validity 
is in question through the seemingly indiscriminate and abrupt nature of attacks, which challenge 
perceptions of security and validation as (using Butler’s term) grievable persons by the American 
military.   
Justice and the Presuppositions for Discourse in the Lifeworld 
 
 Before the interplay of dominant and subversive discourses is entertained, the Western 
presuppositions of Habermasian discourse ethics and Honneth’s theory of recognition should be 
acknowledged. Both Habermas and Honneth openly concede their liberal philosophic 
assumptions throughout their writings, assuming universality of human rights, international law, 
and an implicit expectation for just conduct by states during war. This assumption of 
universality, however, applies equally to powerful and less powerful states, cultures, and 
individuals. Thus, Honneth attempts to account for these presuppositions by acknowledging 
recognition to occur at the individual and collective dimensions allowing for recognition of 
culture. The acquisition of discursive power by collectives allows movement towards justice and 
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is realized through “a transformation of collective self-understanding…that could lead to the 
claim for recognition of one’s own culture.”
201
 
 Because the subversive discourses are directed toward a dominant Western discourse, 
they are underpinned by Western, liberal assumptions of universal human rights, international, 
and just war.    
 First, the universality of human rights establishes a fundamental expectation for the 
recognized dignity of humanity. In a literal sense, human rights are “the rights that one has 
because one is human.”
202
 Due to the tautological nature of this definition, Donnelly goes on to 
explain that human rights are equal in the sense that “one is or is not a human being, and, 
therefore has the same human rights as everyone else.”
203
 Human rights are also inalienable 
based on one’s biological classification as a homo sapiens and cannot be lost or abandoned. “One 
cannot stop being human no matter how badly one behaves nor how barbarously one is 
treated.”
204
 Beetham adds that human rights “seek to guarantee to individuals the minimum 
necessary conditions for pursuing a distinctively human life.”
205
 This sentiment is echoed by 




Traditionally the provisions of human rights have been divided into three categories or 
“generations.” One might think of each generation as forming the levels of a pyramid. The most 
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foundational rights can be found at the base of the pyramid
207
 with less essential or debated 
generations as making up the middle and pinnacle of the pyramid. These levels do not replace 
one another, but are “interrelated…[suggesting] that the protection of the first generation 
political rights and the provision of second generation economic rights will contribute to third 
generation solidarity rights”
208
 Despite claims of universality, Donnelly is careful to note that the 
concept human must be understood as a concrete notion that takes into account, where 
appropriate, cultural and religious practices. Thus, despite its Western origins, the preservation of 
dignity for all humans and their respective cultures should be prioritized.
209
 
Second, is a Western valuing of the viability and accountability of states to the precepts 
of international law. This assumption forms expectations for legal warfare become what 
Habermas refers to as the “constitutionalization of international law,”
210
 which allows for the 
“taming of brute political power.”
211
 This view of the international system requires the 
submission of a global power’s “right to war” to a “continually expanding [international] 
federation that prevents war [and] can curb the inclination to hostility and defiance of the 
law.”
212
 Adherence to the precepts of international law also suggests an acknowledgment and 
acceptance of international underpinning norms that “tie [the international community] together 
because we share them as humans.”
213
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The importance of international law to wartime conduct is vital to the protection of all 
parties within the legal practice of war. As Addis’ norm analysis suggests, international law 
produces the expectations that exist for justice within warfare. The proximity of noncombatants 
to the battlefield has become a key consideration when looking at the legality of UAV-centric 
warfare. While the purpose of this analysis is not to determine the legality of American use of 
UAVs in warfare (especially in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen), the perspectives that have 
been articulated by international lawyers can be helpful in establishing a benchmark for 
understanding the administration of global justice to noncombatants within the international 
community. As Habermas contends, problems that are as complex as eradicating terrorism 
(especially al Qaeda and its affiliates) “can be solved only through joint political action”
214
 with 
international law as its basis for action.  
There are two areas of Jus in Bello that should be considered when determining the 
justice of military engagement. First, proportionality attempts to determine the balance between 
the military advantage achieved by attacking a target and the amount of potential and/or realized 
collateral damage associated with it. This principle, however, should not be viewed as an 
empirical calculus of weighing numbers of civilian to combatant casualties.
215
 Judge Advocate 
General for the Army, Chris Jenks, suggests that determining proportionality can be difficult 
because it is a “subjective determination the military commander makes…As a general rule, 
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The difficulty with proportionality in the case of UAVs, articulated by Vogel, is the case-
by-case nature of each strike. “Thus, the number of civilians killed, or of terrorists killed, is only 
the first part of the analysis—whether the target was of sufficient value and whether the strike 
offered a real military advantage and was conducted with all due caution and concern for 
civilians establishes the operation’s proportionality.”
217
 Additionally, Brunstetter and Braun 
suggest that the use of UAVs may actually increase adherence to the principle of proportionality 
because of a UAVs precision-guided missiles. “The localized application of drone strikes limits 
the destruction because it target the actual individual threat, thus minimizing the force necessary 
to remove it.”
218
   
This, however, leads to the second principle of Jus in Bello in international law, 
discrimination. The legality of UAV strikes within warfare is difficult to determine because the 
definition of those who are defined as combatants and noncombatants can be fluid. Under the Jus 
in Bello expectation of distinction, International law is clear that noncombatants cannot be 
deliberately targeted in warfare. “Only members of a state’s armed forces during armed conflict 
or persons taking a direct part in hostilities may be targeted.”
219
 A person’s role in the conflict 
may not be immediately clear to a UAV pilot who is surveying the scene from above. An 
additional complication for the principle of discrimination is the fact that “suspected militant 
leaders wear civilian clothes. Even the sophisticated cameras of a drone cannot real with 
certainty that a suspect being targeted is not a civilian.”
220
 Though Vogel adds that this is not a 
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problem unique to drone warfare, and that the ability to conduct careful, lengthy surveillance 
increases the potential for discrimination between combatants and noncombatants.
221
 
The third Western assumption underpinning discourse on drone warfare is an implicit 
reliance on Just War Theory (JWT). Emerging from Augustine’s writings in the fifth century CE, 
the premises of Just War Theory have guided ethical understanding and underpinned legal 
interpretation of just conduct of war-wagers. Its viability in technologically changing war 
environments persists as “a moral framework with evolving normative categories that helps us 
talk about the ethics of war.”
222
 This permits JWT an elastic quality that allows for its 
reinterpretation as it is applied to new scenarios and historical contexts. “So while it displays a 
potential for renovation and change, the theory also reflects a strong element of continuity…We 
can be relatively confident that when we tap into the language of just war, we are participating in 
a trans-historical dialogue with the great and the good of previous generations.”
223
 
The principles associated with Just War Theory
224
 present a framework by which we 
might better understand and thus talk about the ethical conduct of war. It also translates from the 
philosophical to the pragmatic, suggesting a standard of justice that is expected within war.  Key 
to the discussion of Jus in Bello, or justice during war, is the treatment of noncombatants. 
Traditionally, Jus in Bello has been divided into two major areas of consideration that are 
mirrored in international law: Proportionality and Discrimination. “Proportionality attempts to 
balance the harm inflicted with the anticipated military advantage of an action, while 
discrimination entails making all efforts to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants, 
                                               
221 Vogel, 123.  
222 Brunstetter and Braun, 338.  
223 Ciran O’Driscoll, “Learning the Language of Just War Theory: The Value of Engagement,” Journal of 
Military Ethics, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2007), 113.   
224 These are commonly delineated as Jus ad Bello categories of Just Cause, Legitimate Authority, Right 
Intention, Likelihood of Success, Proportionality, and Last Resort and Jus in Bello categories of Proportionality and 
Discrimination. While Jus post Bellum is gaining recognition within JWT, it lacks a standardized set of principles 
(see Brian Orend, The Morality of War (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2006) chapters six and seven).  
49 
 
and avoid harm to the latter while still fulfilling the military mission.”
225
 Walzer is clear to note 
that noncombatants “do not forfeit their rights when their states wrongly go to war.” Instead, 




While Walzer argues that within the Just War paradigm “noncombatants cannot be 
attacked at any time,”
227
 he concedes that there are times that noncombatants are placed into 
danger “because of their proximity to a battle that is being fought against someone else.”
228
 This 
is known as the principle of double effect,
229
 which “gets its start from the realization that actions 
often have more than one consequence.”
230
 Under the principle of double effect, both the positive 
and negative consequences of a particular act should be considered before the act is undertaken. 
For example, “Actions performed by a soldier can lead not only to the death of enemy soldiers 
but also the death of by-standers, trauma to other enemy soldier and by-standers, the destruction 
of buildings, damage to the environment, and so on.”
231
 
The turn towards casualty averse and technologically-driven modes of Western warfare 
characterized by the utilization of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles suggests that contemporary 




 coupled with an aversion 
to casualties that causes concern with Just War principles, such as double effect to slide in 
practice. Instead, the practice of risk transfer warfare becomes attractive because it protects the 
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lives of American soldiers, through their spatial separation from the battlefield, at the expense of 
the ontological and physical security of noncombatants in the midst of the war.
234
   
Thus, we see a gap emerging between the expectation for justice as presented through 
human rights, international law, and the just war tradition and the willingness of Western 
(notably American) military strategy to develop and employ weapons that not only distances the 
soldier (in the case of drones, pilots) from the battlefield, but removes them from it, in a physical 
sense, altogether. Consequently, warriors are removed from physical harm, while noncombatants 
disproportionately shoulder the physical risk and threat of warfare. “The consistent overall 
pattern of greater losses of life among civilians than among Western militaries is intended.”
235
 
This tactical pattern has the potential to flirt with the line of illegality, wallowing in the grey 
spaces of morality between black and white. This might be more troubling and difficult for the 
international community to process and interpret than the clear, outright breaking of international 
law.  
Discursive Ethics, Recognition, and Subversive Discourses 
The role of discourse ethics can be understood as the process through which injustice 
might be identified and analyzed discursively.
236
 This often difficult intellectual process is also 
the first step that might be taken to close in the gap between injustice and a clearer pursuit of 
justice for the voices of those who are underrepresented within the traditional discourse. The 
stories of noncombatants whose communities, families, and, sometimes, their very livelihoods 
are threatened through drone-centric warfare have been largely under-told both within public and 
academic discourses. Two recent publications
237
 and the #NotABugSplat art installation,  
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however, possess the objective not only of exposing the “messiness” of the United States’ 
tactical use of drones, but also of telling the stories of those affected in order to bring clarity to 
an intentionally opaque practice. The power of these stories is important as the global and digital 
nature of this conflict has caused for “the claims for recognition of once-distant others [to] 




 Habermas contends that an important aspect of discourse ethics is the application of the 
theoretical to the practical through the practice of dialogue “that draws people together in 
meaningful argument.”
239
 While we might wonder how we are to arrive and judge the arrival at 
truth or validity claims, Habermas provides us with a rather vague term of consensus, which he 
seems to believe is intuitive to human reason. “Moral theory engages in a task of rational 
reconstruction when it elicits from everyday moral intuitions the standpoint of the impartial 
judgment of interpersonal practical conflicts.”
240
 Habermas goes on to reiterate the importance of 
dialogue as a speech act, which means that intentions (as far as they can be determined) matter. 
“It cannot abandon the performative attitude of participants in interaction; only in this way can it 
maintain contact with intuitive knowledge acquired through socialization that makes moral 
judgments possible.”
241
   
The Living Under Drones and Amnesty International reports and the #NotABugSplat art 
installation present two examples of subversive discourses that have shown some success in 
contributing to, perhaps even sparking public debate on the impact of drone warfare on 
noncombatants. Each is a response to the dominant discourse of casualty averse warfare and 
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challenges the public sphere to consider the wider impact of casualty aversion upon 
noncombatants. This discourse seems to be predicated upon the question: For whom is casualty 
averse warfare actually casualty averse?      
 In September of 2012 the report Living Under Drones, a joint venture between scholars at 
Stanford and New York University was released. Its intent to provocatively challenge the 
dominant discourse of casualty aversion is presented in the first sentence of its executive 
summary. “In the United States, the dominant narrative about the use of drones in Pakistan is of 
a surgically precise and effective tool that makes the US safer by enabling ‘targeted killing’ of 
terrorists, with minimal downsides of collateral impacts. This narrative is false.”
242
 The report 
goes on the acknowledge the security threats apparent to American and Pakistani interests along 
the largely ungoverned Afghanistan/Pakistan border, but “in light of significant evidence of 
harmful impacts to Pakistani civilians and to US interests, current policies to address terrorism 
through targeted killings and drone strikes must be carefully re-evaluated.”
243
 
The equally provocative Amnesty International report “Will I Be Next?” was published 
in October of 2013. It, too, seeks to engage the dominant discourse regarding American tactics of 
drone warfare, expressing the discrepancy of experiences by noncombatants and reported 
precision of UAV strikes. 
The USA, which refuses to release detailed information about 
individual strikes, claims that its drone operations are based on 
reliable intelligence, are extremely accurate, and that the vast 
majority of people killed in such strikes are members of armed 
groups such as the Taliban and al-Qa’ida. Critics claim that drone 
strikes are much less discriminating, have resulted in hundreds of 
civilian deaths…and foster animosity the increases recruitment 
into the very groups the USA seeks to eliminate.
244
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Often utilizing more damning language, the Amnesty International report expresses concern that 
drone-based attacks “have resulted in unlawful killings that may constitute extrajudicial 
executions or war crimes…[and] may have also violated human rights.”
245
  
Given the above analysis asserting that the internet and social media applications can be 
understood as a new form of the public sphere, it is worth noting that www.livingunderones.org, 
where the report has been posted and maintained, is designed as a multimedia experience. In 
addition to the provision of data about drone strikes and written victim stories, the website has 
linked video interviews (also posted on YouTube) in which interviewees explain their 
experiences while living in an active drone war zone. This provides visitors to the site with the 
ability to disseminate information through their social media presence, thus perpetuating the 
discourse. The Amnesty International “Will I Be Next?” report possesses a similar, though not as 
flashy, web presence and includes an interactive story map and a Tumblr page entitled 
#GameOfDrones detailing a traveling protest movement, elucidating physical in addition to 
cyber forms of discourse.     
The response to the subversive discourse elicited through these NGO reports is illustrated 
in President Barack Obama’s 2013 speech on drone policy in which he explains that the 
utilization of a drone-based strategy saves American lives, despite the threat, and in some cases, 
loss, of noncombatant lives. He is intentional to discredit the extent of noncombatant casualties 
described in reports such as Living Under Drones. “Much of the criticism about drone strikes—
both here at home and abroad—understandably centers on reports of civilian casualties. There’s 
a wide gap between US assessments of such casualties and nongovernmental reports.”
246
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President Obama goes on to explain the necessary tragedy of civilian deaths in the course of 
America’s pursuit to eradicate terrorism.    
As Commander-in-Chief, I must weigh these heartbreaking 
tragedies against the alternatives…It is false  to assert that putting 
boots on the ground is less likely to result in civilian deaths or less 
likely to create enemies in the Muslim world. The results would be 
more U.S. deaths, more Black Hawks down, more confrontations 
with local populations, and an inevitable mission creep in support 
of such raids that could easily escalate into new wars.
247
    
 
 While President Obama acknowledges the loss of noncombatants in drone strikes, 
referring to them as “tragedies,” he also explains that the alternative to drone warfare would 
require greater risk to American troops. He even references one of the most horrifying U.S. 
military experiences in recent history, the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu in Somalia, enshrined in the 
book and movie entitled, Black Hawk Down.
248
 Ultimately, this speech serves as a re-entrenching 
of the dominant discourse, though collected data since the publication of these reports suggests 
that drone strikes in Pakistan have decreased to their lowest level since 2007.
249
 Correlation, of 
course, should not be considered to equal causation. 
The critique of the dominant discourse has been perpetuated beyond NGOs and political 
speeches into the public sphere. For example, journalist Conor Friedersdorf recently questioned 
the political use of the term “militants” to describe all casualties of drone strikes. He concludes 
that the use of the words “‘human’ or ‘person’ instead.” He concludes, “Say how many people 
died, that they haven’t been identified, and that we don’t know if they’re among the hundreds of 
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innocent humans killed by drones or not.”
250
 This hints at Honneth’s call for recognition of the 
other to be established as a precursor to discourse. Using nondescript terms (a practice that this 
paper is guilty of) such as “noncombatant” and “militant” is an attempt to sanitize the reality that 
casualties of warfare are, in fact, people.      
 This humanizing process of populations targeted by UAV warfare is a central component 
of the subversive discourses challenging the dominant discourse. Humanization through creative 
visualization is also what makes the Pakistani art installation, #NotABugSplat such an impactful 
contribution to the subversive discourse. Influenced by the building-sized portraits envisioned 
and installed around the world by “semi-anonymous” artist, JR,
251
 the #NotABugSplat art 
installation tries “to reach the people pulling the trigger in America’s drone wars—the drone 
operators themselves.”
252
 While the aim of revealing the innocent, thoughtful face of a Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa child to American drone pilots through their cameras, the installation has a wider 
audience. Meyer notes that the poster is “also designed to be captured by satellites in order to 
make it a permanent part of the landscape on online mapping sites” and that “it challenges all 
those who have access to images photographed from the sky to use their power to make a more 
just world.”
253
    
 The artwork’s title is a visual, discursive challenge to the military terminology 
popularized by a 2012 Rolling Stone article which uses the term bug splat. “The military slang 
for a man killed by a drone strike…since viewing the body through a grainy-green video image 
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gives the sense of an insect being crushed.”
254
 It’s presence within the digital public sphere has 
been pervasive as its title, which includes a hashtag (#) indicates an intention for aerial 
photographs of the artwork to be widely disseminated through social media like Twitter and 
Instragram, both of which use hashtags as an organizational device for searching and grouping 
tweets or photos with the same hashtags. 
 In addition to its proliferation on social media and presence in mainstream news, the 
#NotABugSplat art installation received additional publicity when artist J.R. was interviewed on 
the August 28, 2014 episode of Comedy Central’s The Colbert Report giving the project and the 
subversive discourse popular culture exposure. Regarding #NotABugSplat, host Stephen Colbert 
sarcastically (and in all seriousness) quipped: “So what you’re saying is that I have to consider 
every person as human. That I can’t just think of people as part of a population or a 
statistic…Anybody who accidentally dies in a war that’s otherwise justified, I have to grieve 
over?”
255
 While, it seems that Colbert is prompting an answer in the affirmative, these questions 
support the assertions of Butler and Honneth: as Butler argues, life is valuable if grieved and, as 
Honneth suggests the foundation of discourse should be humanizing recognition. 
 The discursive exchange between the dominant public discourse, supporting drone 
warfare and subversive discourses designed to challenge these commonly held beliefs has clearly 
not reached a level of consensus or validity. However, the discursive pursuit of justice for 
noncombatants caught within the context of drone warfare seems to have rooted itself within the 
public sphere, especially present on the internet and on social media applications. At the core of 
the subversive discourses presented here is an intentional focus on granting noncombatants faces, 
voices, and humanity. Not only is this an attempt to provide recognition to the innocent civilian, 
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but the telling of people’s stories allows for their history to be acknowledged, making their 
stories known, resonate, and the lives of the story teller and the receiver to be connected in such a 
way that grievability can be attributed not to a foreign, distant noncombatant, but to a human.       























 The Revolution in Military Affairs has produced tactical weapons, such as weaponized 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, that seek to elevate strategies of casualty aversion through precision 
and speed while transferring risk to noncombatants. This creates a gap between justice expected 
by the international community—characterized by expectations of universal human rights, 
adherence to international law, and implicit dependence on the Just War Theory tradition—and 
the justice experienced by noncombatants affected by the presence of UAVs in their immediate 
contexts. Habermasian discourse ethics, augmented by Honneth’s precondition of recognition 
and informed by Butler’s concept of grievable life, presents a useful analytical framework 
through which the interaction of dominant and subversive discourses can be explained in the 
lifeworld. Subversive discourses ultimately contribute to critical evaluation of commonly held 
values and can promote the narrowing of perceived gaps between justice expected and justice 
experienced within the context of war. 
The intrinsic value of noncombatants caught within the crosshairs of UAV cameras 
cannot be realized until they are recognized or discriminated (as is defined under the 
international law of Jus in Bello) as possessing grievable lives and the holistic impact that a lack 
of recognition can have upon a family’s livelihood when a noncombatant is maimed or killed 
erroneously in a UAV strike. This recognition cannot happen on an international level until the 
United States is willing to recognize the real number of deaths of combatants and noncombatants 
in UAV strikes. Amnesty International recommends: “At a minimum the USA must disclose 
basic factual and legal information about its drone program in Pakistan”
256
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 Transparency would give the United States government and the Obama Administration, 
specifically, the ability to explain and account for its UAV tactics to the international 
community, showing itself willing to be a fully functioning member within the international 
community, fully responsible to international law. But, perhaps more importantly for the people 
of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen, it would allow for the stories of UAV victims to be fully 
welcomed into the international discourse and for their injustice to be recognized on a global 
scale. It is through this exchange that an “inspiring vision of a discourse of justice…could reveal 
contemporary injustices for the moral outrages they surely are”
258
 and move towards closing the 
validity gap. 
  The peril of precision and technologically-based warfare, however, is a trade-off 
between the human and the mechanized. This creates greater safety for some, while placing 
others at greater risk. Thus, the function of public discourse becomes a valuable platform through 
which critique can be articulated. From the ancient Greek polis to the Romantic-era salon to the 
social media applications of the Information Age, discourse has shaped public opinion through 
dissemination and debate within the public sphere. As communication becomes increasingly 
swift and succinct, discursive contributions to the public sphere will increase. While some social 
media-based protest movements will move public opinion, others will gather a small following 
before fizzling. The difference between the two is prolonged engagement.  
Thus, if the prominence of drone warfare is to be questioned and scaled back, those 
concerned with the recognition and grievability of noncombatant lives must continue to raise 
questions about the ethical ramifications of casualty averse warfare within the public sphere. It is 
through this increased discourse that noncombatants will transition from “collateral damage” to 
#NotABugSplat. 
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